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RIGHTS OF AN UNBORN CHILD - SUIT FOR
PRENATAL INJURY ALLOWED
IN MARYLAND
Damasiewicz v. Gorsuch'
The plaintiff was an infant en ventre sa mere2 at the
time an automobile driven by one of the defendants struck
the automobile operated by the other defendant, in which
the plaintiff's mother. was a passenger. It was alleged that
the negligence of the defendants caused the premature
birth of the plaintiff and permanent injuries resulting in
the loss of sight of both of his eyes. The trial court sus-
tained demurrers filed by both defendants, without leave
to amend, and entered judgment for costs in their favor,
from which judgment this appeal was taken. The Court of
Appeals reversed and remanded. Thus, for the first time,
this Court had before it the question whether there is any
right of action based upon injury to a person prior to his
birth, i. e., inflicted while still in his mother's womb, and
it was held that such a right did exist.
The Court reviewed all of the cases upon the point, and
indicated the lack of any direct English decision before 1776,
or indeed up to the present time. Courts have denied re-
covery in Ireland,8 Massachusetts,4 Illinois,5 Rhode Island,'
Missouri, Alabama,' Texas, 9 Michigan," Pennsylvania,"
New Jersey, 2 and Wisconsin 1  (as to an inviable 4 child,
1 79 A. 2d 550 (Md., 1951).
2I.e., in its mother's womb. Black, Law Dictionary, 659 (3rd ed., 1933).
8Walker v. ,Great Northern Railway, 28 L. R. Ireland (Q. B. Div.) 69
(1891).
'Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northampton, 138 Mass. 14 (1884). See also
Bliss v. Passanesi, 95 N. E. 2d 206 (Mass., 1950).
5Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital, 184 Ill. 359, 56 N. E. 638 (1900). See also
Smith v. Luckhardt, 299 Ill. App. 100, 19 N. E. 2d 446 (1939).
'Gorman v. Budlong, 23 R. I. 169, 49 A. 704 (1901).
Buel v. United Railways Co., 248 Mo. 126, 154 S. W. 71 (1913).
'Stanford v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., 214 Ala. 611, 108 So. 566
(1926).
' Magnolia Coca Cola B. Co. v. Jordan, 124 Texas 347, 78 S. W. 2d 944, 97
A. L. R. 1513 (1935). See also Lewis v. Steves Sash & Door Co., 177 S. W.
2d 350 (Tex. Civ. App., 1943).
10 Newman v. City of Detroit, 281 Mich. 60, 274 N. W. 710 (1937).
n Berlin v. J. C. Penney Co., 339 Pa. 547, 16 A. 2d 28 (1940), apparently
overruling an earlier lower court decision in Kine v. Zuckerman, 4 Pa. Dist.
& Co. R. 227 (1924).
Stemmer v. Kline, 128 N. J. L. 455, 26 A. 2d 489 (1942).
"Lipps v. Milwaukee Electric Ry. & Light Co., 164 Wisc. 272, 159 N. W.
916 (1916).
" That is, a child not having reached the point in foetal life at which it
could live separate from its mother, if separated by natural or artificial
means. For a discussion of viability in general see, BEcK, MEDICAL JURS-
PRUDENCE, 404 et seq. (11th ed., 1860).
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but expressly reserving opinion as to a viable child). The
opinion of the Maryland Court points out that the decisions
have not always been based upon the same grounds, that
strong dissents appear in several of them, and that later
cases have frequently distinguished or tried to distinguish
them. Recovery has been allowed in California 5 on the
basis of a local statute, and in Louisiana 6 and Canada'
upon the basis of the Civil Law. The only square decisions,
prior to the principal case, in agreement with our Court in
allowing a recovery have been in the District Court for the
District of Columbia, s in Minnesota, 19 and in two Ohio de-
cisions.20 Since the decision in the principal case, both
Georgia and New York have allowed recovery. The latter
state reversed, by a 5 to 2 vote, its rule of thirty years stand-
ing, and cited the principal case.2' In addition, virtually all
writers who have treated the problem have urged such a
right of recovery.2 2 Nonetheless, the Maryland decision is
15 Scott v. McPheeters, 33 Cal. App. 2d 629, 92 P. 2d 678, 93 P. 2d 562
(1939).
1" Cooper v. Blanck, 39 So. 2d 352 (La., 1923), holding the Civil Law as the
basis of Louisiana jurisprudence.
11 Montreal Tramways v. Leveille, 4 (1933) D. L. R. 337 (1933), applying
the Civil Law of Quebec.
11 Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (1946), the suit being based on pro-
fessional malpractice.
19 Verkennes v. Cornlea, 229 Minn. 365, 38 N. W. 2d 838, 10 A. L. R. 2d 634
(1949), being a suit for malpractice in a maternity case.
10 Williams v. Marion Rapid Transit, 152 Ohio St. 114, 87 N. E. 2d 334, 10
A. L. R. 2d 1051 (1949) and Jasinsky v. Potts, 153 Ohio St. 529, 92 N. E. 2d
809 (1950).
Tucker v. Carmichael & Sons, 208 Ga. 201, 65 S. E. 2d 909 (1951). Woods
v. Lancet, 102 N. E. 2d 691 (1951), refusing to follow Nugent v. Brooklyn
Heights R.R. Co., 154 App. Div. 667, 139 N. Y. S. 367 (1913) and Drobner
v. Peters, 232 N. Y. 220, 133 N. E. 567, 20 A. L. R. 1503 (1921). The Court in
Woods v. Lancet said, p. 694:
"The sum of the argument against plaintiff here Is that there Is no
New York decision in which such a claim has been enforced. Winfield's
answer to that (4 Univ. of Toronto L. J. 285 (1941-2)) will serve: 'if
that were a valid objection, the common law would now be what it was
in the Plantagenet period.' And we can borrow from our British friends
another mot: 'When these ghosts of the past stand in the path of justice
clanking their medieval chains the proper course for the judge is to
pass through them undeterred.' (Lord ATKIN in United Australia, Ltd.
v. Barclay's Bank, Ltd., (1941) A. C. 1). We act in the finest common-
law tradition when we adapt and alter decisional law to produce com-
mon-sense justice."
2 See PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS (1941), 190, and articles
cited in his footnote 12. See also the following articles and comments in
accord with this view, published since 1941; Injuries to an Unborn Child -
When Is An Unborn Child Considered a Person in Legal Terminology?,
6 Univ. of Newark L. Rev. 113-20 (1941); Winfield, The Unborn Child,
4 Univ. of Toronto L. J. 278-95 (1942) ; New Infant Rights in Tort, 35 Va.
L. Rev. 618-27 (1949) ; Gamble, Tort Actions for Injuries To Unborn Infants,
3 Vand. L. Rev. 282-97 (1950) ; Schell, Torts - Unborn Child - Right of
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in accord with what is still the minority view. The import-
ance of the problem was pointed out by the forward-looking
Appellate Division of New York, in Nugent v. Brooklyn
Heights Railroad Co.28 (since overruled, as pointed out
above), where, although refusing to allow recovery, the
Court said:
".... if this action upon proper pleading may not be
maintained, there is no remedy unless in an action by
the mother for damages to her by reason of injuries to
her son, and that would be inadequate .... The fact
that the child was deformed and would suffer thereby,
would cause the mother mental pain, and, even if she
could recover for that, the mental pain the child would
suffer, and the mere fact of deformity with its conse-
quent diminution of the value of capacities and facul-
ties could not be included in her recovery. The father,
in case he could recover at all, could do so only so far
as the injury enlarged the expense of the child's main-
tenance and entailed loss of service. So, however the
subject be viewed, there is a residuum of injury for
which compensation cannot be had save at the suit of
the child, and it is a question of grave import whether
one may wrongfully deform or otherwise injure an un-
born child without making amends to him after birth."
Several cases are important enough to bring to mind
here, despite the fact that they are discussed in the Court's
opinion. The first case that arose was Dietrich v. Inhabit-
ants of Northhampton,24 in which the opinion was by Mr.
Justice Holmes (then an associate on the Massachusetts
Court). That suit was under a wrongful death statute, and
it should be noted that the child was not directly injured
save by the transmission of shock from the mother, and
the injury was apparently before the age of viability, for
the child was described as being too little advanced in foetal
life to continue a separate existence. Recovery was denied,
with Justice Holmes pointing out the lack of precedent,
although the situation was surely not a new one. The theory
of the decision seems to rest primarily upon the ground
that until birth the child is part of the mother, and at the
Action for Prenatal Injury, 28 N. C. L. R. 245-9 (1950) ; Gaines, The Infant's
Right of Action for Prenatal Injuries, 1951 Wisc. L. Rev. 518-28.
Numerous other comments and notes (collected in the Index to Legal
Periodicals, under the heading "Infants") are also In general agreement.
2 Supra, n. 21, 368.
Supra, n. 4.
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time of this accident, therefore, the only injury was to
the mother.
Walker v. Great Northern Railway Co.,25 decided by the
Supreme Court of Ireland, also denied recovery. Two of
the justices followed the reasoning of the Dietrich case, i.e.,
that the child was a part of the mother and had no separate
existence at the time of the injury. The other two justices
held that the defendant contracted with the mother alone,
was unaware of her pregnancy, and therefore owed no duty
to the plaintiff.
Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital" seemed firmly to estab-
lish the rule against recovery. It approved the Dietrich
case and quoted O'Brien, Ch. J., in the Walker case, as
follows:
"That a child before birth is, in fact, a part of the
mother, and is only severed from her at birth, cannot,
we think, be successfully disputed."'27
The dissent of Justice Boggs in the Allaire case was re-
ferred to by our Court of Appeals as one of the ablest argu-
ments on record for the plaintiff's side of the case. Stressing
medical knowledge upon the subject, Justice Boggs main-
tained that when a child reaches the age of viability, "it is
but to deny a palpable fact to argue there is but one life,
and that the life of the mother".28 He then stated the rule
as he thought it should be and as most writers have since
favored it:
"The law should, it seems to me, be that whenever a
child in utero is so far advanced in prenatal age as
that, should parturition by natural or artificial means
occur at such age, such child could and would live
separable from the mother, and grow into the ordinary
activities of life, and is afterwards born, and becomes
a living human being, such child has a right of action
for any injuries wantonly or negligently inflicted upon
his or her person at such age of viability, though then
in the womb of the mother."29
The rule of these cases stood undisturbed by any state
appellate court until 1949, when recovery was allowed in
2Supra, n. 3.
184 Ill. 359, 56 N. E. 638 (1900).
Ibid, 640.
2See ibid, 56 N. E. 638, 640, 641 (dissenting opinion).
2See ibid, 642.
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Ohio."° In the same year the Supreme Court of Minnesota
also allowed such an action.8 1 The cases allowing recovery
generally stress medical knowledge to the effect that a
separate existence begins at that point in foetal develop-
ment known as the age of viability.
Several things in the Maryland decision should be con-
sidered. The decision specifically ruled only upon the ques-
tion of injury to a viable child, and it was pointed out that
recent cases have distinguished this from a situation in-
volving a non-viable child, citing Lipps v. Milwaukee Elec-
tric Ry. and L. Co.8" The Court stated that this was an effort
to bring the older doctrine that a child is part of the mother
until birth into line with modern medical facts. The signifi-
cant language then used by the Court is this:
"But, from a medical point of view, a child is alive
within the mother before the time arrives when it can
live apart from her. If it is injured at a time when,
according to Blackstone, it is 'able to stir in the mother's
womb' there would seem to be just as logical a basis
for allowing it to recover, as if it were injured after
it had reached the period in its growth when it could
be removed from the mother and live. In both cases
it is alive, and in both cases there has occurred an in-
jury to a living human being for which the responsible
party should be made liable." (Emphasis added.) 88
This would seem to be the first indication by any court that
recovery might be had for an injury to a child not yet
viable, or capable of separate existence. But if recovery
should be given to protect an unborn viable child it would
seem that it should be extended to protect a non-viable
child also. For it is said upon medical authority that, "The
foetus is certainly, if we speak physiologically, as much a
living being immediately after conception as at any other
time before delivery; and its future progress is but the
development and increase of those constituent principles
which it then received. 81 4 The concurring opinion of Judge
Henderson,88 however, would seem to make it quite doubt-
ful if even our Court of Appeals would allow such a right
Supra, n. 20.
Supra, n. 19.
Supra, n. 13.
Damaslewicz v. Gorsuch, 72 A. 2d 550, 559 (Md., 1951).
BECK, MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE, Vol. 1, 227 (10th ed.), quoted In Magnolia
Coca Cola B. Co. v. Jordan, 124 Texas 347, 78 S. W. 2d 944, 949, 97 A. L. R.
1513 (1935).
U See supra, n. 33, 562.
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of action. His opinion attached little significance to "the
alleged progress of medical science", and his agreement
with the Court's opinion was based upon the early criminal
law as stated by Lord Coke. 6 Murder and torts both being
crimes against the person, he concluded that liability in
tort for harm to unborn children should extend no further
than the protection given by the criminal law. This law,
at least, would punish for the appropriate level of criminal
homicide one who injured the pregnant mother, whereby
the child was born alive, but succumbed post birth to the
effects of the pre-natal injuries." The statement that "the
rule should not be applicable unless it is shown that the
embryo has acquired a human personality and become
viable",88 indicates that Judge Henderson would not extend
the rule of this case to permit recovery for an injury to an
inviable child.
Two members of the Court89 dissented from the result
of the majority opinion, thereby showing a greater respect
than the rest of the Court for Justice Holmes' decision in
the Dietrich° case, for the decisions of the majority of
courts that have passed on the point, and for the position of
1As stated by Holmes, J., in Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northhampton,
138 Mass. 14, 15 (1884) :
"The plaintiff founds his argument mainly upon a statement by Lord
Coke, which seems to have been accepted as law in England, to the
effect that if a woman is quick with child, and takes a potion, or if a
man beats her, and the child is born alive and dies of the potion or
battery, this is murder."
It may be speculated whether the Maryland decision may have any effect
in the field of criminal law upon what is usually termed "infanticide". As
a general proposition the subject of a homicide must be a living human
being, but the problem Is when to determine that a conceived child becomes
the subject of homicide. In CLARK & MARSHALL, A TREATISE ON THE LAW
OF CamiEs (3rd ed., 1927), Sec. 234, it is said:
"According to the better opinion, a child is not fully born and is not
the subject of homicide, until the umbilical cord has been severed, for
until then the blood of the child is renovated through the lungs of the
mother, and its circulation, therefore, is not independent .... It is not
necessary that the child shall be fully 'born before the injury is inflicted.
If a child is wounded by an instrument, or if a drug is administered,
while the child is in its mother's womb, or while it is in the process of
delivery, and It is fully born alive, and dies afterwards as a result of
the wound or drug, It is homicide." (First emphasis added.) See cases
cited therein.
There are apparently no Maryland decisions on this point, but It would seem
doubtful if the present case would be sufficient to persuade the Court to
deviate from the majority rule In the analogous criminal problem.
Quaere: Would the criminal law punish for criminal battery of the child,
as separate from battery of the mother, If the child were either still-born, or
born alive but deformed?
18 See supra, n. 33, 562 (Concurring opinion).
1 Markell, J., and Collins, J. See supra, n. 33, 561.
,0 Supra, n. 36.
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the Restatement of Torts.41 This opinion emphasized the
practical results of the decision, saying in part:
"We need not ... we must not - shut our eyes to
the possible practical consequences of our decisions....
Whether the persuasive abstract reasoning in the opin-
ion of a plurality of the court should prevail over prac-
tical consequences that might result is properly a legis-
lative, not a judicial, question. '42
Though frequently not mentioned at length, many of the
cases seem really to be wrestling with the concepts of duty
and of the "unforseeable plaintiff" in the law of negligence.
Prosser 48 says that as the idea of negligence developed there
also developed the idea of duty, i.e., a relationship between
the plaintiff and the defendant without which no liability
could exist. Though the concept is firmly imbedded in law,
he informs us that "courts will find a duty where, in gen-
eral, reasonable men would recognize it, and agree that it
exists".44 The difficult problem is to determine if any duty
is owed to an unforseeable plaintiff. Such would seem to
be the position of a child en ventre, and the question is
whether the duty not to injure the mother can be extended
to the child who, it might well be argued, is beyond the
zone of any apparent danger. The Restatement of Torts45
has taken the view that there is no duty owed to the unfor-
seeable plaintiff. There is, however, authority to the con-
trary," taking the position that "Every one owes to the
world at large the duty of refraining from those acts which
unreasonably threaten the safety of others."4 7 The question
has not been settled by the courts yet, and Prosser makes
the following statement upon it:
"The essential issue is whether the plaintiff's in-
terests are to be afforded protection against the defen-
dant's conduct, and 'duty' is nothing more than a word,
and a very indefinite one, with which we state our
conclusion. '48
"See RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934), Ch. 42, Sec. 869.
42 See Damasciewicz v. Gorsuch, 79 A. 2d 550, 561, 562 (Md., 1951) (dis-
senting opinion).
PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS (1941), 178 et 8eq.
"PROSSER, op. cit. supra, n. 43, 181.
RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934), Sec. 281.
PROSSER, op. cit. supra, n. 43, 183.
"Ibid, quoting dissent by Andrews, J., in Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co.,
248 N. Y. 339, 162 N. E. 99 (1928).
," PROSSE, op. cit. supra, n. 43, 184.
1951]
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Thus our Court of Appeals, following the recent decisions
of two other states and the District of Columbia, has adopted
the view that the unborn child is to be protected against
the negligent actor, calling attention to a law review article
urging the recognition of "a legal right in the newborn
child to begin life with a sound body".49
The opposing view has been well summed up by the
Texas Supreme Court in Magnolia Coca Cola Botting Co. v.
Jordan:5
"That man (referring to the test of the ordinary
reasonable man) reckons life from the time of birth.
His conscious care and solicitude are for the expectant
mother and not for the unborn child apart from her.
His obligations and his liability in damages for his acts
should be measured and determined from his view-
point."
Thus the issue is whether the innocent plaintiff or the negli-
gent defendant, whose negligence was to another person
however, should bear the loss. The tendency of the recent
cases seems to extend the defendant's liability, which really
imposes no new burden on him, for the exercise of reason-
able care will still protect him from liability. While the
Maryland case has given impetus to what has been called
the "shifting weight of authority" in the case of the unborn
child, it remains to be seen how far the Court will extend
its decision in other situations involving the unforseeable
plaintiff. It is extremely doubtful that the case here con-
sidered will be at all extended, for Judge Henderson in con-
curring was especially careful to point out that the Court
was deciding only the immediate issue before it, saying:
"I think it should be emphasized that we are now deciding
only the general proposition and that all subsidiary ques-
tions are reserved."'" The decision of such reserved ques-
tions must wait until such time as the application of the
expanding rule is necessitated by the concrete facts of
actual cases presented to the Court in the future.
" Damasciewicz v. Gorsuch, 79 A. 2d 550, 558 (Md., 1951), calling attention
to 63 Harv. L. Rev. 173 (1949-50).
0 124 Texas 347, 78 S. W. 2d 944, 949, 97 A. L. R. 1513 (1935).
See 8upra, n. 49. 563.
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